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Abstract
Wireless networking technologies based on the IEEE
802.11 series of standards fail to authenticate man-
agement frames and network card addresses and suf-
fer from serious vulnerabilities that may lead to de-
nial of service, session hijacking, and address mas-
querading attacks. In this paper, we describe and im-
plement a specification-based intrusion detection sys-
tem for IEEE 802.11 wireless infrastructure networks,
which not only provides attack detection, but also im-
plements policy compliance monitoring. The specifica-
tion used by our intrusion detection system is derived
from network protocol state transition models and site
security policy constraints. We also perform an exper-
imental and comparative analysis of the technique to
assess its effectiveness. The results indicate that the
approach is superior at successfully detecting a greater
variety of attacks than other existing approaches.
1. Introduction
The notion of monitoring computer systems and
networks for malicious activity is long-standing and
nowhere is the requirement for preventative approaches
to security to be supplemented by a monitoring and
detection capability more exigent than in wireless local
area networks (WLANs). The broadcast nature of the
physical (PHY) layer in wireless networks makes gain-
ing access to the medium a trivial undertaking. Flawed
legacy encryption schemes such as wired equivalence
privacy (WEP), the forgeabilty of management frames
and the spoofability of Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses and other frame contents combine to make
attacks like eavesdropping, session hijacking and denial
of service (DoS) a real threat for WLANs.
While recent enhancements to the IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard [8] undoubtedly improve the level of security that
preventative techniques can bring to bear on wireless
network deployments, two factors must be considered.
Firstly, transitional security deployment modes that
support the concurrent use of the obsoleted and the
current security primitives, leave the network vulnera-
ble to attacks that target the legacy algorithms. Sec-
ondly, while a large number of authentication protocols
are supported via the extensible authentication proto-
col (EAP) framework adopted by IEEE 802.11i, few are
suitable for use in wireless environments [14]. Both of
these factors serve to increase the configuration burden
associated with deploying secure wireless networks and
motivate the need for techniques to monitor for policy
compliance as well as intrusions when wireless networks
are deployed in security sensitive environments.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) monitor either
for evidence of intrusions or for deviations from ex-
pected behaviour. When the events of interest to an
IDS define the undesirable behaviour, or intrusions,
the system is said to be a misuse-based IDS. When the
events of interest to an IDS are the expected or nor-
mal behaviours of the monitored system, with intru-
sions defined as deviation of the monitored behaviour
from this baseline, the system is said to be an anomaly-
based IDS. Misuse-based IDSs use signatures for attack
detection, while anomaly-based systems rely on iden-
tifying attacks by detecting deviations from learned
normal behaviour. Misuse-based systems enjoy the
reputation of having a low false positive rate, while
anomaly-based systems can generate a large number
of false positives. However, unlike anomaly-based sys-
tems, misuse-based systems cannot detect novel attacks
or attacks for which no signatures are available.
More recently (and as discussed in related work in
Section 3), the construction of anomaly-based systems
that define models of correct behaviour from explicit
policy declarations [4], referred to as specifications1, in-
1While some authors will refer to specification-based intrusion
detection as a separate category of detection technique to misuse
and anomaly detection, we view the specification-based approach
as a useful technique for constructing anomaly-based IDSs.
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stead of observing and learning correct behaviour dur-
ing a training phase, represent a promising direction
for improving the utility of anomaly-based IDSs and
reducing their false positive/false negative rate.
1.1. Our Contribution
In this paper we describe the construction of an
IDS, using the specification-based approach, for IEEE
802.11 infrastructure wireless LANs. The correct
model of behaviour used by our IDS is formed from
a specification that is derived by combining a model of
the underlying protocol state machines with the con-
straints imposed by the security policy of the system.
We report on our implementation and demonstrate
its effectiveness via experimentation and comparative
analysis. In summary, the contributions of this work
include:
1. the description of an approach for constructing
an anomaly-based IDS, in which the underlying
model of correct behaviour is derived from an ex-
tensible specification;
2. the application of the anomaly-based IDS to IEEE
802.11 infrastructure wireless LANs; and
3. an experimental and comparative analysis of the
technique to assess its effectiveness.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 describes infrastructure wireless LANs and
details the specific threats to them. Related work is
covered in Section 3. Our approach to implementing
a specification-based IDS and application of this ap-
proach to infrastructure wireless LANs is presented in
Section 4. Experimental analysis and comparison of
our technique with other wireless IDSs is discussed in
Section 5. Finally, conclusions and directions for future
work are presented in Section 6.
2. Security of Infrastructure WLANs
The technique we describe in this paper has been
applied to detect a variety of attacks that are possible
in infrastructure WLANs. An infrastructure WLAN
is one in which the wireless nodes (STAs) communi-
cate via an access point (AP) which is connected to a
wider fixed (or infrastructure) network. Our technique
focuses on modelling the protocols used between the
STAs and the AP.
Numerous security weaknesses existed in early im-
plementations of IEEE 802.11 wireless network com-
ponents (some of these weaknesses are inherent in
the protocols and algorithms specified in the 802.11
standard). The more recent 802.11i enhancements to
the MAC layer protocols address many of the orig-
inal weaknesses. The IEEE 802.11i standard intro-
duces the notion of a robust security network associ-
ation (RSNA) which allows mutual authentication, in-
troduces key management protocols and new data en-
cryption and integrity protocols. RSNA uses 802.1X
and EAP for authentication and access control. How-
ever, 802.1X and EAP were not designed specifically for
wireless environments and many of the authentication
protocols supported by EAP are unsuitable for use in
WLANs [14]. The 802.11i standard allows RSNA and
pre-RSNA (i.e., WEP and the original 802.11 authen-
tication) to co-exist in what is referred to as a tran-
sitional security network (TSN). This means that an
STA may be configured to connect to both RSNA and
pre-RSNA networks. In this case, a security roll-back
attack may be employed by an adversary to trick the
STA into using pre-RSNA by impersonating associa-
tion frames from an RSNA-configured AP [7]. An-
other significant problem that remains, even in 802.11i
networks, is that the management frames used by the
MAC layer are not authenticated. Neither the original
IEEE 802.11 standards, nor the recent IEEE 802.11i
standard specify mechanisms for protecting the in-
tegrity of management frames, leaving IEEE 802.11
based WLANs vulnerable to management frame spoof-
ing and the associated DoS attacks that such spoofing
permits [1]. Even the EAP frames used for authenti-
cation in 802.11i networks are unprotected and can be
easily used as a means to launch similar attacks against
wireless LANs [12].
In this paper we demonstrate that by using a spec-
ification based upon the state model of the 802.11,
802.1X and EAP protocols we are able to detect a sig-
nificant number of the DoS attacks which arise due
to unauthenticated management and EAP frames. In
addition, we show that by monitoring protocol execu-
tions to ensure that certain constraints are met (for
example, constraints on the algorithms or authentica-
tion protocols used) it is possible to detect violations
of organisational security policy.
3. Related Work
Our work combines state transition modelling with
constraints derived from a security policy to construct
a specification of correct behaviour that can be used in
an anomaly-based IDS. The relevance of previous work
in the areas of state transition modelling, specification-
based intrusion detection, and wireless intrusion detec-
tion to our current work is now discussed.
Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06)
0-7695-2716-7/06 $20.00  © 2006
Ilgun et al. [9] proposed the use of state transition
analysis for intrusion detection. The work currently
presented obviously draws on the foundational ideas
presented by Ilgun et al. [9] but instead of using state
transitions to model attacks, we use state transitions
as the foundation for a specification-based anomaly de-
tection scheme. Specification-based intrusion detection
was first suggested by Ko [10] and required the defini-
tion of desirable application behaviour (with respect to
a site security policy) and the subsequent monitoring
of the execution of the application for violations of the
specification. Sekar et al. [13] generated a specification-
based model of the internet protocol (IP) state machine
and combined this with more traditional statistical ma-
chine learning techniques for anomaly detection. Our
work is similar, in that we use the network protocol
specification as the starting point to simplify the gen-
eration of our state transition specification, but dif-
fers in that we have no need to superimpose statis-
tically based techniques to achieve accurate detection
of intrusions. Tseng et al. [2] applied the specification-
based approach to detecting intrusions targetting rout-
ing protocols in ad hoc networks. The specification
of the correct behaviours expected are created from
a finite state machine model of the routing protocol.
While this work serves as a potent stimulant for our
work, which applies the specification technique to in-
frastructure, rather than ad hoc networks, our work
differs in that it does not require the use of such strong
assumptions. For example, there is no assumption in
our work that MAC addresses cannot be forged and in
fact, our approach allows us to detect MAC address
spoofing attacks.
Current approaches for detecting address spoofing
attacks include: the monitoring of MAC frame se-
quence numbers [15] and verification of MAC addresses
against lists of valid users or valid wireless network
card vendors [3]. As both MAC addresses and frame
sequence numbers can be arbitrarily changed, such
approaches are insufficiently robust. While Guo and
Chiueh [6] describe how monitoring patterns of se-
quence number changes can improve the robustness
of sequence number monitoring for attack detection,
the technique remains unsuitable for policy compliance
monitoring.
Techniques based on monitoring the physical char-
acteristics, as viewed by the receiver of radio transmis-
sions, have also been proposed and implemented. Two
parameters appear to be useful, including the received
signal strength indication (RSSI), which provides a nu-
meric indication of the strength of a received signal,
and round trip time (RTT) measurements. Approaches
based on RSSI monitoring have been reported by Lim
et al. [11] and Gill et al. [5]. Gill et al. also report pre-
liminary success on implementing RTT monitoring [5].
A significant advantage of using physical layer param-
eters in an IDS is that they are much more difficult to
accurately predict, and therefore fabricate (as an at-
tacker may wish to do), given the dynamic nature of
the wireless environment. The use of such parameters,
however, requires considerable fine-tuning of the de-
ployment environment so that appropriate thresholds
can be selected in order to minimise false positives and
reduce the likelihood of false negatives.
A significant observation that can be made regarding
existing wireless intrusion detection approaches is that
all the techniques, unreliable and ineffective as they
may be, are focused on attack detection only. None
of the techniques surveyed support policy compliance
monitoring, an essential and significant contribution of
the work presented in this paper.
4. Specification-Based Approach
In this section, we describe how a specification is
constructed for our IDS and how such a specification
can be used by a wireless sensor to monitor a network
for both attacks and compliance with the network se-
curity policy.
At a high level, a passive wireless sensor monitors
the radio frequency (RF) spectrum and constructs a
state transition model for each STA and associated AP
that it senses. The sensor is configured with a spec-
ification, which encapsulates both the expected state
transitions and the constraints of the network security
policy. Each frame received by the sensor is evaluated
against the specification. If this evaluation reveals that
a security constraint is violated, or unexpected state
transitions occured, an alert is raised by the sensor.
To motivate and explain our approach in concrete
detail, we consider the example of a security sensitive
WLAN deployment within an organisation. Given the
sensitivity of the deployment and following a risk as-
sessment, an organisational security policy for the use
of WLANs is established. In summary, this policy re-
quires that: the wireless network implement a robust
security network (RSN), utilising the advanced encryp-
tion standard (AES) for link layer integrity and confi-
dentiality protection; port-based network access con-
trol is implemented using 802.1X; and the STAs must
mutually authenticate with the network using EAP-
TLS.
The specification used by our IDS consists of two
major components. The first is the state transition
model, which describes the expected states a legiti-
mate, policy compliant STA and AP would transition
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through when establishing a security association (SA).
The second component models the constraints imposed
by the detail of the security policy.
4.1. The State Transition Model
In the context of our working example, the state
transition model must include components that model
the protocols involved in establishing a SA, that is the
802.11, 802.1X and EAP state machines. An overview
of the expected exchanges used to establish an SA be-
tween an STA and an AP, along with the resulting state
transition diagram based on those exchanges, is shown
in Figure 1.
The state transition model is much less complex
than the contributing state machines. The reasons for
this are that the transition model only has to include
security relevant states that are passively observable.
A significant number of internal, or security irrelevant
states do not need to be modelled and are unavailable
to a passive observer. A beneficial side-effect of this is
that only a limited amount of state must be maintained
by the passive monitor thereby reducing the resource
requirements of the monitor.
Figure 1 shows the expected incremental order in
which the legitimate STA and the AP should exchange
frames between each other during SA establishment
and the order in which their state transitions should oc-
cur. A legitimate STA is expected to transition through
state 0 through to state 9 in a strict sequence (see Fig-
ure 1) to establish a SA with an AP. Table 1 and Fig-
ure 1 show all the frames originating from the STA
or the AP that cause transitions in the state transi-
tion model and their target states. The states are ex-
pected to be traversed incrementally and last state of
the STA cannot be the same as its current state with
the exception of state 9. This is the state when the SA
is complete and the STA and the AP engage in data
communication.
4.2. Detecting State Transition Violations
All STA-AP associations should strictly transition
through the sequence of states specified by the state
transition model (see Figure 1). Any anomalous transi-
tions in the observed state transition model can be used
to detect violations of the model. There can be three
kinds of anomalous transition: (a) a negative state
shift, which occurs when the STA transitions from a
higher state to a lower state; (b) a positive state shift,
which occurs when the STA bypasses an incremental
state; and (c) a zero state shift, which occurs when
Phase 1Phase 2Phase 3
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9
Figure 1. State Transition Model
Frame Type Classification Target Transition State State Number
Authentication Request +ve WAIT AP OPEN AUTH SUCCESS 1
Authentication Response (success) +ve AUTHENTICATED UNASSOCIATED 2
Association Request +ve WAIT AP ASSOC RESPONSE 3
Association Response (success) +ve AUTHENTICATED ASSOCIATED 4
ReAssociation Request +ve WAIT AP ASSOC RESPONSE 3
ReAssociation Response (success) +ve AUTHENTICATED ASSOCIATED 4
EAP-Request Identity +ve 802.1X INIT 5
EAP-Response Identity +ve WAIT EAP AUTH 6
EAP-Success +ve 4 WAY HANDSHAKE INIT 7
EAPoL-Key (message 3) +ve KEYDONE PORTCLOSED 8
Data +ve DATA TX RX 9
Deauthentication -ve UNAUTHENTICATED UNASSOCIATED 0
Disassociation -ve AUTHENTICATED UNASSOCIATED 1
EAPoL-Start -ve/+ve 802.1X INIT 5
EAPoL-Logoff -ve 802.1X INIT 5
EAP-Failure -ve 802.1X INIT 5
Table 1. Frame Type Transitions
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the STA does not change its current state from its last
state.
4.2.1 Negative Shifts
Negative state shifts occur when the STA, rather than
moving sequentially through states 0 to 9, transitions
to a state smaller than its last state. A negative shift is
usually a symptom of a DoS attack where management
or EAP frames are used to cause a negative state tran-
sition. Although all of these frames can be spoofed to
launch a denial-of-service attack, they do serve a legiti-
mate resource management function in WLANs. Hence
a negative shift does not necessarily imply a DoS at-
tack. To accommodate legitimate negative state shifts,
the sensor uses an index of suspicion for every STA.
This index is incremented for every observed negative
shift for that particular STA and when this index ex-
ceeds a threshold value, the sensor raises an alert to
that effect. Hence the index of suspicion is used to
reduce the number of false positives and to flag the
occurrence of excessive negative shifts as a likely DoS
condition.
4.2.2 Positive Shifts
Positive state shifts occur when the STA, rather than
moving sequentially through states 0 to 9, transitions
to a state greater than its last state by a value of more
than 1. Usually a positive shift is a consequence of
frame loss, but in the presence of a preceding nega-
tive shift, a positive shift in the STA’s state can be an
indication of a spoofing, session hijacking or man in
the middle (MITM) attack. Session hijacking attacks
usually consist of two steps: the adversary forces the
legitimate STA to disconnect from the network, usually
via a DoS attack; and then assumes the MAC address
of the victim STA to communicate with the network.
This attack will cause two shifts in the STA’s observed
state transition model: a negative shift when the DoS
attack is launched; and a positive shift when the adver-
sary sends data frames spoofing the legitimate STA’s
MAC address.
Frame loss is very common in IEEE 802.11 networks.
This might cause a positive shift in the observed state
transition model. For example, if the sensor does not
receive all transmissions, it may perceive a STA’s state
to be different from the STA’s real state. To accommo-
date the effects of frame loss, the sensor uses an index
of suspicion for keeping track of all positive state shifts
observed for a particular STA. If the number of pos-
itive shifts exceeds the predefined index of suspicion
threshold for a particular STA, the sensor alerts this
condition as excessive frame loss.
4.2.3 Zero Shifts
Zero shifts occur when the STA’s current state and last
state are the same. In the state transition model (see
Figure 1), the STA is expected to enter only one state
repeatedly, namely state 9, after it has successfully es-
tablished security association. If a STA repeatedly re-
mains in a state other than 9, this could be indicative of
a misconfiguration or a DoS flooding attack. However,
a zero shift condition could also occur if the monitor
receives retransmissions of traffic to/from the STA. To
minimize the rate of false positives generated from this
condition, the sensor maintains an index of suspicion
where an alert is raised only when the number of zero
state shift events for a particular STA exceeds the pre-
determined threshold for zero state shifts.
4.3. Unexpected Frames
Table 1 and Figure 1 show all the frames that re-
sult in state transitions (in the state transition model)
and their target states. These frames can be classi-
fied into two categories: frames that lead to a +ve
(positive) transition and frames that cause a -ve (neg-
ative) state transition. Each frame has a target tran-
sition state that it would cause the sensor’s observed
state transition model to transition to. However, de-
pending on the classification (+ve/-ve) of a frame and
the current state of the STA in the state transition
model, the frame might not lead to any transition in
the state transition model. We refer to such frames as
unexpected frames. Real world STAs and APs respond
only to certain frames in certain states. The unexpected
frames represent all frames that would be ignored by
the STA/AP in its current state.
The logic to determine if a frame is an unexpected
frame for the current state is now explained. For a
+ve frame, a transition is only processed if the current
state of the STA is smaller than or equal to the target
transition state for that frame. Similarly a -ve frame
leads to a state transition only if the current state of
the STA in the state transition model is greater than
or equal to the target transition state for that frame.
If an unexpected frame is detected, an alarm is raised.
4.4. Attack Classification
When attacks are detected they are classified us-
ing the type-subtype of the last frame that caused the
alarm and examining the address fields of the frame.
For instance, if a Deauthentication Broadcast Flood is
launched, a zero state transition tolerance threshold
exceeded alarm is raised. This alarm indicates a flood-
ing attack. The type-subtype of frames being injected
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would be deauthentication and the destination address
field would be broadcast. This information is used
to classify the attack as a Deauthentication Broadcast
Flood attack. Also in order to classify unexpected frame
flooding attacks, a counter is used which is incremented
for every unexpected frame received. When this counter
exceeds a pre-configured threshold, an alarm is raised
to indicate that an unexpected frame flooding attack
was detected.
4.5. Security Policy Constraints
While the state transition model serves as a good
starting point for a detection system it must be fur-
ther refined. In order to detect intrusive actions that
do not violate the state transition model but do vio-
late the security policy, additional constraints must be
incorporated into the specification. These constraints
are derived from the network security policy require-
ments. In the case of our example, these constraints
are on the capabilities that the network should adver-
tise (via the robust security network information ele-
ment (RSN IE)), the supported encryption algorithms
and the required authentication method. In summary
these constraints are:
• RSN mode of operation: To monitor for com-
pliance with this constraint, the wireless sensor
will inspect the contents of the advertised AP ca-
pabilities contained in the RSN IE to verify that
required parameters are present and that prohib-
ited parameters are absent. The list of permitted
and prohibited modes of operation are provided to
the sensor via runtime configuration directives.
• 802.1X: The use of port-based network access
control can be evaluated from the state transition
model. A network not supporting 802.1X, will not
enter states 5 and 6 of the state transition model
(as shown in Figure 1), but will move directly from
state 4 to state 9, which will result in an alert be-
ing raised if port-based access control is required
by the policy.
• AES link layer encryption: As with the re-
quirement for RSN, the monitor evaluates the RSN
IE and checks that AES is the only supported pair-
wise cipher suite advertised for use. Again, the list
of permitted and prohibited encryption algorithms
are provided to the sensor via runtime configura-
tion directives.
• EAP-TLS for authentication: For stations in
state 6, the monitor checks that any EAP Re-
quest frames destined for the monitored STA con-
tain an EAP-Type of EAP-TLS. A more sophisti-
cated monitoring capability could be implemented
by adding EAP method specific states to the state
transition model, to ensure that the EAP method
was executing as expected. Such an approach
would be of limited use when tunnelled EAP meth-
ods2 are employed.
For each STA, the sensor checks the security con-
straints whenever it transitions between states. Any
violation of these security constraints is raised as an
alarm as a violation of the site security policy.
5. Experimentation
A number of experiments were carried out with the
following goals: 1) to establish the feasibility and relia-
bility of the proposed specification based intrusion de-
tection technique; 2) to perform a comparative analysis
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed tech-
nique against other wireless intrusion detection tech-
niques; 3) to establish the impact of the sensor location
on reliability and effectiveness of the proposed tech-
nique; and 4) to demonstrate the policy compliance
monitoring capabilities of the technique.
5.1. Methodology and Setup
The experimental setup involved six nodes: an STA,
an AP, an attacker and three sensors. For the purposes
of the experiments, a Robust Secure Network (RSN)
was set up using hostapd software running on a Linux
laptop as the AP. A Windows XP PC was used as the
STA. Three Linux laptops were used as passive sensors
and a laptop running Linux was used as the attacking
station. An open source wireless IDS, Snort-Wireless3
was used for comparative analysis with its default set-
tings. A custom Snort-Wireless preprocessor (State-
Transition-Processor) was used on the sensors to pro-
cess all WLAN events passively observed by the sensor
and use the intrusion detection techniques presented in
Section 4 to detect violations of the site security pol-
icy. A custom tool zaildar that supports injection of
arbitrary frames into a WLAN was developed for these
experiments.
To satisfy the goals of the experiments, as identi-
fied earlier, the experiments were divided into three
sets: Set1, Set2 and Set3. In Set1 experiments a num-
ber of DoS attacks were launched against established
2Tunnelled EAP methods are executed over encrypted links
and are not passively observable.
3http://snort-wireless.org
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associations by spoofing the MAC addresses of the le-
gitimate AP or STA. A data exchange was established
between the legitimate STA and AP, after establish-
ment of a SA, so that effects of the DoS attacks were
obvious. In Set2, MAC spoofing based attacks were
launched against the WLAN infrastructure by random
STAs where no SA existed between the random STAs
and the AP. All attacks involving masquerading the
STA source MAC that were launched in Set1 were also
launched in the Set2 experiments. Set3 experiments
were carried out to establish the false positive rate of
the proposed technique in the absence of any attack
traffic and to demonstrate the ability of the proposed
technique to provide policy compliance monitoring. In
these experiments, after establishment of SA, a data ex-
change was started between the STA and the AP and
the sensors were used to monitor this normal WLAN
activity. Then for policy compliance testing, the AP
was reconfigured to implement an Open Network in-
stead of a RSN and the sensors were used to monitor
another data exchange between the STA and the AP.
The Open Network does not require any authentication
and merely requires the STA to be in state 4 to be able
to perform data exchange with the AP.
In order to assess the proposed technique’s ability
to deal with varying levels of frame loss, three sen-
sors were located at increasingly greater distance from
the AP and the STA. It was expected that as the dis-
tance between the sensor and the monitored entities
increases, the rate of false positives would increase for
that sensor due to frame loss. To test this theory, the
AP, the STA, the attacker and a sensor (Sensor1) were
placed in one lab room, in close proximity to each other.
The second sensor (Sensor2) was placed in another lab
room about 20 meters away from the position of the
AP and the third sensor (Sensor3) was placed further
away about 50 meters away from it in yet another room.
The sensors were used to obtain traffic captures, dur-
ing the running of the attacks, from their respective
locations. The traffic capture (on all three sensors)
was terminated after every attack and saved in a sep-
arate file. This ensured that each traffic capture file
contained only one attack, effectively labeling the at-
tack captures. Traffic captures from each sensor were
then processed by the State-Transition-Processor on
the sensor in offline mode. The experiments were car-
ried out in a busy RF environment where numerous
actively used WLANS were known to operate. Hence,
the sensors captured noise as well as relevant attack
traffic.
In the interest of comparative analysis, Snort-
Wireless was used with its default settings with the
macspoof, the authflood and the deauthflood preproces-
sors enabled. In the remainder of the paper this set-
ting of Snort-Wireless is referred to as Snort-Wireless-
Default. A comparative study was performed on detec-
tion capabilities of Snort-Wireless-Default and our cus-
tom Snort-Wireless preprocessor i.e. State-Transition-
Processor.
5.2. Choosing Thresholds
Due to legitimate use of various management frames
in WLANs and the existence of unexpected state
transitions and frames (for benign reasons such as
frame loss and restransmissions) thresholds were imple-
mented in order to effectively manage the rate of false
negatives and false positives for the State-Transition-
Processor. In this paper, we refer to these as indices of
suspicion and their values were determined by a combi-
nation of empirical analysis of WLAN traffic and what
was considered to be most reasonable for that particu-
lar threshold. A threshold value of 5 was used for each
of the negative state shift, the zero state shift and the
unexpected frame tolerance thresholds. While positive
state shift tolerance threshold was set to 2. Post-hoc
analysis of the experiment captures also confirmed the
effectiveness of these thresholds in keeping false nega-
tives and false positives to a minimum.
5.3. Results and Observations
This section presents the results and observations
of executing State-Transition-Processor and Snort-
Wireless-Default on captures obtained from Set1, Set2
and Set3 experiments. The macspoof preprocessor of
Snort-Wireless-Default uses the flawed technique of us-
ing the patterns of sequence number changes to detect
intrusions. As expected, it generated numerous false
alerts for every MAC address in every capture file, ir-
respective of the attack. This indicated that this pre-
processor was too noisy to provide any real results for
our experiments and was ignored in the evaluation of
the results for all our experiments.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of executing State-
Transition-Processor and Snort-Wireless-Default over
captures obtained from the three sensors for each at-
tack launched in Set1. The first column describes
the attack type and the target state transition for the
STA. The Alarms column describes the type of alarm
generated and the state transition sequence that trig-
gered it. The following keys are used to describe the
type of attacks: Zero = zero state transition toler-
ance threshold exceeded, Pos = positive state transi-
tion tolerance threshold exceeded, Neg = negative state
transition tolerance threshold exceeded, noSA = Data
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frame detected from a MAC without SA, nonCompli-
antNetwork= RSN IE does not match the required IE,
Spoofing = Positive state shift detected immediately
proceeding a negative state shift or a -ve frame (see
Section 4.2), unexpected frame = unexpected frame re-
ceived for current state, unexpected frame flood = unex-
pected frame tolerance threshold exceeded. noSA is a
specialized case of an unexpected frame. In the remain-
der of the paper, these alarm keys are used to refer to
the alarms. The middle column represents success or
failure in detecting the attack for the capture obtained
from that sensor. The
√
symbol is used to represent
successful detection, the × symbol is used to represent
detection failure. All the attacks in Set1 were correctly
classified by the State-Transition-Processor. However,
Snort-Wireless-Default only detected and classified the
deauthentication flooding attacks and the Authentica-
tion Flood attack. It has no capability of detecting the
other attacks in Table 2.
Attack Sensor1 Sensor2 Sensor3 Alarms
Deauthentication
√ √ √
Zero (0→0), Neg (0,1,2...→0)
Broadcast Flood DoS (9→0) Spoofing , noSA (0→9)
Targeted Deauthentication
√ √ √
Zero (0→0)
DoS (9→0)
Client Initiated Targeted
√ √ √
Zero (0→0), Neg (0,1,2...→0)
Deauthentication DoS (9→0) Spoofing , noSA (0→9)
Disassociation Broadcast
√ √ √
Zero (2→2),
Flood DoS Attack (9→2) Neg (2,3,4...→2)
Targeted Disassociation
√ √ √
Zero (2→2),
DoS (9→2) Neg (2,3,4...→2)
Client Initiated Targeted
√ √ √
Zero (2→2),
Disassociation DoS (9→2) Spoofing , noSA (2→9)
Association Flood
√ √ √
unexpected frame flood,
unexpected frame
Authentication Flood
√ √ √
unexpected frame flood,
unexpected frame
EAP-Success Flood
√ √ √
unexpected frame flood,
unexpected frame
EAPoL-Start Flood
√ √ √
Zero (5→5),
DoS (9→5) Spoofing , noSA (5→9)
EAP-Failure Flood
√ √ √
Zero (0→0), Neg (0,1,2...→0)
DoS (9→5) unexpected frame flood,
unexpected frame
EAPoL-Logoff Flood
√ √ √
Zero (5→5), Neg (5,6,7...→5)
DoS (9→5) Spoofing , noSA (5→9)
EAP-Request
√ √ √
unexpected frame flood,
Identity Flood DoS unexpected frame
Table 2. State-Transition-Processor attack de-
tection and alarms for Set1 experiments
For all the attacks launched in Set2, the State-
Transition-Processor raised type Zero alarms on pro-
cessing captures obtained from all the sensors. An
exception was the Authentication Flood attack, which
generated unexpected frame and unexpected frame flood
alarms. Other exceptions were Association Flood and
EAP-Failure Flood attacks which resulted in unex-
pected frame, unexpected frame flood and Zero alarms.
All attacks were classified correctly by the State-
Transition-Processor for all captures. On the other
hand, Snort-Wireless-Default had the same detection
rate (on all three sensors) as in Set1 experiments.
For the first part of Set3 experiments, where a
normal RSN data transfer was monitored, the State-
Transition-Processor did not raise any alarms for cap-
tures obtained from Sensor1 and Sensor2. However, the
capture from Sensor3 led to generation of false alarms
of type Pos and noSA. For Open Network traffic moni-
toring, the State-Transition-Processor raised alarms of
type nonCompliantNetwork and noSA for captures ob-
tained from all sensors. The capture from Sensor3 also
led to generation of false alarms of type Pos. In both
cases, Snort-Wireless-Default raised no alarms apart
from the macspoof alarms which were ignored as noise.
Attack Sensor1 Sensor2 Sensor3 Alarms
Deauthentication Broadcast Flood DoS
√ √ × deauthFlood
Targeted Deauthentication DoS
√ √ √
deauthFlood
Client Initiated Targeted
√ √ √
deauthFlood
Deauthentication DoS
Authentication Flood
√ √ √
authFlood
Table 3. Snort-Wireless-Default attack detec-
tion and alarms for Set1 experiments
5.4. Analysis
The State-Transition-Processor was able to detect
all the attacks launched in experimentation Set1 and
Set2 correctly by monitoring the state changes in the
state transition model described in Section 4.1. It also
successfully detected policy violations in Set3 by ap-
plying site security constraints and demonstrated a low
rate of false positives.
5.4.1 Attack Detection
The State-Transition-Processor was not only success-
ful in detecting all attacks in Set1 and Set2, it also
classified the detected attacks correctly in all cases by
simply using the type-subtype of the last frame caus-
ing an increment in one of the indices of suspicion and
examining the address fields of the frame. In Set1 and
Set2 experiments, the alarm type of Zero was correctly
raised in all flooding attacks and in instances where
there were numerous unsuccessful attempts by the STA
to establish SA with the AP, the alarm type of Neg was
also correctly raised indicating a DoS attack. When-
ever a data frame was detected to/from a MAC ad-
dress that had not completed its SA, a noSA alarm
was raised. MAC address spoofing attacks (alarm type
Spoofing) were also correctly detected whenever a pos-
itive state shift was detected immediately following a
negative state shift or a -ve frame. In these experiments
an alarm type of Spoofing was raised whenever the sen-
sor detected a data frame to/from the entity that had
just received a -ve frame or had undergone a nega-
tive shift. As described in Section 4.2, the frames that
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would not normally be processed by a real STA/AP
in a particular state were flagged by raising the unex-
pected frame alarm type. The unexpected frame flood
alarm type was raised whenever a threshold number of
the unexpected frames was detected.
There were some unexpected frame transitions that
occurred in the Set1 and Set2 experiments. For in-
stance, in Set1 experiments, the EAP-Failure attack
led to the generation of additional alarms of type un-
expected frame and unexpected frame flood. This was
caused because on receiving an EAP-Failure frame, the
STA sends a deauthentication frame to the AP, hence
transitioning the observed state to 0. Hence every sub-
sequent EAP-Failure frame led to the generation of an
unexpected frame alarm as the STA was in state 0. A
complete list can be seen in Table 2. However none
of these unexpected transitions affected the successful
classification/identification of the real attack.
In all experiments the use of indices of suspicion in
the State-Transition-Processor assisted in eliminating
the majority of sources of false positives and multiple
alerts for the same attack, while maintaining a null
false negative rate. In Set3 experiments, the captures
obtained from Sensor3 led to the generation of a num-
ber of false positives. As expected, the most common
false positives generated were alarms of type Pos and
noSA as these alarms are directly related to frame loss.
The rate of false positives appears to be directly pro-
portional to the rate of frame loss and Sensor3, being
the furthest away from the AP and the STA, experi-
enced the most frame losses. No false positives were
generated by Sensor1 or Sensor2. By correlating the
alarms generated by different sensors, most of the false
positives can easily be eliminated. All false positives
generated in Set3 experiments were eliminated when
results from the three sensors were correlated. In the
correlation process, perhaps more weight can be placed
on the alarms generated by the sensors located in close
proximity of the AP and the STA4.
In Set3 experiments, the State-Transition-Processor
correctly detected violation of the site security policy
by simply using the state transition model and related
constraints (provided via a config file). The IE of the
new WLAN did not match the expected IE and the
state transition model did not expect data transfer to
occur before state 8 is reached. In Open Networks data
transfer can occur after state 4. This led to generation
of the nonCompliantNetwork and noSA alarms.
4This scheme will have to be assisted by some flavor of loca-
tion aware infrastructure
5.4.2 Comparative Analysis
In the experiments, Snort-Wireless-Default was only
able to detect the authentication flood attacks and the
various deauthentication flood attacks and was unsuc-
cessful in detecting attacks violating the site security
policy; whereas State-Transition-Processor successfully
detected all the launched attacks (see Table 3 and Sec-
tion 5.3). A noticeable drawback in Snort-Wireless-
Default is that it does not provide any DoS attack
detection apart from flooding attacks, which is fur-
ther limited to just authentication and deauthentica-
tion flood attacks. Also its deauthflood and authflood
preprocessors require the injected frames to arrive at a
certain rate (which is configurable) for successful detec-
tion of flooding attacks. For instance Snort-Wireless-
Default did not detect the deauthentication broadcast
flood attack in the traffic capture obtained from Sen-
sor3 since, due to frame loss, Sensor3’s capture file did
not represent the attack incoming at a high rate (see
Table 3). State-Transition-Processor has no such pre-
conditions and is capable of detecting flooding attacks
without any dependence on the rate of frame injection.
Besides flooding attacks, State-Transition-Processor
is also capable of detecting spoofing/MITM/session hi-
jacking attacks by checking for a positive state shift im-
mediately following a negative state shift or a -ve frame.
This detection mechanism is much more reliable and ro-
bust than the one used by Snort-Wireless-Default i.e.
detecting gaps in sequence numbers of frames (mac-
spoof preprocessor). State-Transition-Processor can
even detect stealthy DoS attacks such as when an at-
tacker monitors a legitimate STA passively and injects
a DoS attack frame into the WLAN every time the
STA reaches half way through establishing SA with
the AP. However, Snort-Wireless-Default has no means
of detecting similar attacks. Snort-Wireless-Default is
also not capable of detecting random injection attacks
aimed at consuming network bandwidth such as the
injection of data frames with random STA source ad-
dresses and injection of random frames which will have
no impact on the state of the STA (i.e. unexpected
frames). The State-Transition-Processor would detect
this as anomalous activity. Snort-Wireless-Default re-
quires a separate preprocessor to detect each kind of
attack, while State-Transition-Processor can detect at-
tacks without requiring any additional algorithms or
preprocessors 5. State-Transition-Processor does not
require constant code updates/patches to detect new
attacks and has a very small footprint and hence can
be easily deployed on a large scale without the need of
5The authors however acknowledge the flexibility provided by
the design of Snort-Wireless which enables pre-processors to be
readily plugged in for enhanced functionality
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extensive computing power.
6. Conclusions And Future Work
In this work we have presented an approach for con-
structing an IDS for infrastructure WLANs using a
specification-based approach. This system implements
both attack detection and policy compliance monitor-
ing, a unique contribution of this work. The speci-
fication used by the system comprised a state tran-
sition model and set of constraints. Construction of
the state transition model was based on the underlying
network protocol specifications (IEEE 802.11, 802.1X,
and EAP). Constraints were derived from an example
security policy.
The IDS constructed using these techniques was im-
plemented as a Snort-Wireless preprocessor and its ac-
curacy and sensitivity were evaluated. The technique
proved capable of passively detecting all known attacks
and effective at monitoring for policy compliance. Ex-
perimental analysis demonstrated that the technique,
when combined with the use of indices of suspicion was
able to detect all intrusions with a minimal number of
false positives (i.e. the technique is accurate) and no at-
tacks went undetected (i.e. the technique is sufficiently
sensitive). The system meets the requirement of being
maintainable. As an implementation of an anomaly
based approach, the system does not require updates
as new attacks, or variants of attacks emerge. The use
of runtime configuration parameters permits the con-
straints used by the system to be easily updated as the
network security policy changes.
In future work, we aim to evaluate the attack re-
sistance of the approach to confirm that it is able to
reliably report intrusions in the presence of attackers
that are attempting to exhaust the resources of the
monitor, by instantiating a large amount of state on
the monitor for example. We also aim to study more
complicated and complex algorithms to determine the
values for indices of suspicion. We would also like to
study the effects of tuning these thresholds on the false
positives and false negatives.
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